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1. Introduction 
1.1. Despite steeply declining output and very difficult trading conditions, 
international commercial shipbuilding remains a major global industry.  $80.4 billion 
worth of new ships were delivered in 2016 with Japan accounting for 17% of that 
total.   This is a relatively low annual value: the shipbuilding market is cyclical in 
terms of both demand and price is currently in a trough phase.  Output peaked most 
recently in 2010/11, when the value of deliveries exceeded $140 billion per annum.     
1.2. The importance of the industry extends well beyond the shipyards 
themselves, with around 70% of the value of commercial shipbuilding typically being 
in the supply chain, benefitting steel and marine equipment manufacturers.  The 
diversified high economic value of commercial shipbuilding has been utilised as part 
of national economic development strategies in Japan, South Korea and, most 
recently, China.  
1.3. The modern commercial shipbuilding industry was established in Japan 
following WWII1.   Study of the history of the industry reveals that politics, in addition 
to commercial business motives, has been a strong feature of its development.  In 
particular, government intervention has commonly been used to support capacity 
during periodic downturns, for example in Europe in the 1980s, and to assist in the 
start-up of new industries.  The scale of modern shipbuilding and the investment 
required, coupled to the risk involved in a highly cyclical market, suggests that it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish a significant presence in commercial 
shipbuilding in the modern era without government support.   Such government 
interventions create the potential for market distortions from time to time. 
1.4. Despite the economic importance of the industry, the shipbuilding business is 
under-researched at the academic level and relatively poorly understood in terms of 
economic fundamentals.  This was found to be a problem in 2003, when the 
European Union tried to prosecute a complaint through the World Trade 
Organization, seeking redress for alleged anti-competitive practices and subsidies in 
the industry in South Korea.  The WTO panel concluded that the EU had failed to 
establish sufficiently the nature of the international commercial shipbuilding market 
and its pricing mechanisms.  Fundamentally, the panel concluded that the EU had 
failed to establish that a commercial shipbuilding market exists at all.  The problem 
was related to the range of different products that shipyards typically include in their 
product mixes and how these are linked economically, in particular in relation to 
price.  How could it be shown, for example, that economic behaviour in a shipyard in 
one country producing a particular product (for example an LNG tanker) could affect 
prices for a different product (for example a container ship) in a different shipyard in 
a different country? 
                                            
1 Stott, P.W. (2017) 'Shipbuilding innovation: enabling technologies and economic imperatives', 
Journal of ship design and production, 33(3), pp. 1-11. 
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1.5. Research undertaken at Newcastle University2 between 2012 and 2017 
aimed to address the WTO panel’s concerns and to improve the knowledge of the 
working of the international commercial shipbuilding market.  This report summarises 
some of the key conclusions of that work and how they relate to the industry in 
Japan.  It has been prepared by Dr Paul W Stott, senior lecturer in marine production 
and shipping market analysis3. 
2. Executive summary 
2.1 Commercial shipbuilding output demonstrates a very strong cyclical pattern 
over the long term.  4 large peaks of output can be seen over the past 125 years, 
with peaks occurring roughly every 30 years.  The peaks have been followed by 
extended trough periods, which have been accompanied by low capacity utilisation 
and poor trading conditions for shipbuilders.  The underlying causes of this 
behaviour persist and there is no reason currently to assume that this pattern will not 
propagate in the future. 
2.2 The shipbuilding cycles are exaggerated by the effects of shipyard backlog.  
At the peak of output in 2011 the backlog of work in the global orderbook exceeded 
five years.  There are ‘no brakes’ on output and delivery of unwanted ships persists 
long after it has been realised that the fleet is expanding too quickly to be absorbed 
by growth in seaborne trade.  The result is overcapacity in the fleet and extended 
periods of poor freight rates.  This suppresses shipbuilding demand and in turn 
contributes to the overheated nature of subsequent peaks.  It is not proposed that 
the cycles of shipbuilding demand themselves could be modified, but actions could 
be considered to try to reduce the level of over-ordering and the exaggeration of the 
cycle, leading to better sustainability in both shipping and shipbuilding.  This is 
recommended for further study. 
2.2 It is widely considered that international commercial shipbuilding may be 
regarded as a ‘hegemony’, that is to say is dominated by a single competitor nation’s 
industry, and that the market leading nation shifts over time.  Study of market share 
back to the 19th century shows that a dominating position has been held by 
industries in the United Kingdom, followed by Japan, South Korea and, most 
recently, China.  The true existence of a hegemony is questioned, however, and 
belief in the inevitability of these shifts is not helpful in considering shipbuilding 
strategy at the national level. 
2.3 It is true that the industry in the United Kingdom has seen a decline from 
dominating market leader to zero, since WWII.  The shipbuilding industry in Japan 
has also subsequently seen a decline as the lead shifted to South Korea, but the 
Japanese industry’s decline does not have the same characteristics as were seen in 
the United Kingdom.  Most importantly, the factors that led to the United Kingdom’s 
                                            
2 The research was funded internally by the School of Marine Science and Technology.  Full results 
can be found in: Stott, P. (2017) ‘Competition and subsidy in commercial shipbuilding’. PhD thesis. 
Newcastle University. 
3 paul.stott@newcastle.ac.uk 
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exit from commercial shipbuilding are not present in the industry in Japan.  Both the 
United Kingdom and Japan’s industries derived their success in commercial 
shipbuilding from a strong technical lead and a strong domestic market.  The United 
Kingdom lost both these factors and this was a root cause of the decline of the 
industry in that country.  Japan, conversely, has lost neither factor and the 
characteristics of the industry’s development is therefore very different to the case of 
the United Kingdom. 
2.4 South Korea has no significant domestic market and has never developed a 
technological lead.  The root cause of dominance for the industry in that country can 
be found in the development of economies of scale, linked to a strong domestic 
supply chain.  South Korea’s factors of success are therefore very different to the 
preceding two market leaders, Japan and UK.  South Korea’s strategy has led to a 
highly concentrated industry, with 7 ultra-large shipyards, each processing over three 
million tonnes of steel per annum at the peak.  The sustainability of this strategy over 
the longer term is questioned, however, when viewed against the highly cyclical 
nature of demand.  Whilst such mega-yards are undoubtedly highly efficient at peak 
times, low capacity utilisation away from the peak periods may offset the advantages 
gained from scale over the full cycle.  Economy of scale provides limited competitive 
advantage in the periods where the market is unable to provide the scale of workload 
needed.  Study of the development of shipyards’ backlog of work suggests that the 
industry in South Korea may be more vulnerable than that in Japan in the current 
poor market conditions. 
2.5 The commercial shipbuilding market is found to exist in three sectors: the 
Workboat Market below 500 GT, the Small Ship Market between 500 and 5,000 GT 
and the International Commercial Shipbuilding Market above 5,000 GT.  The sectors 
are demarcated by differences in products, domestic ordering preference and 
workload, the largest sector accounting for about 90% of all commercial shipbuilding.  
Perhaps most importantly the three sectors are also differentiated by the nature of 
the shipbuilding cycle.  All three sectors exhibit volatility but only the largest sector is 
subject to the extreme cyclical behaviour that was described earlier. 
2.6 The shipbuilding market is characterised not by the sale of products but by the 
sale of capacity.  That capacity has to be flexible to build a range of products, the 
product mix, and the relationship between capacity and product mix leads to linked 
prices between products.   
2.7 To be compatible (substitutable) within a shipyard’s product mix, the different 
products that make up that mix must key in to the shipyard’s factors of 
competitiveness.  Analysis of these factors shows that the range of compatible 
products is wide.  The main exceptions are LNG, for which barriers to entry exist, 
and Cruise and Ferry, for which barriers to entry exist and for which the nature of 
investment in the shipyard and its skills and supply chain is different to the main 
cargo-carrying sectors. 
2.8 Analysis of newbuilding prices has revealed that cross price elasticity exists in 
international commercial shipbuilding, but more work is needed to fully understand 
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the market’s pricing mechanisms.  Cross price elasticity shows that the price of one 
ship type can be influenced by demand for a different ship type and that over the 
period 2003 to 2015 the most influential products determining newbuild prices were 
large container ships and LNG tankers. 
2.9 The issue of ‘like product’ or ‘substitutability’ of products has been addressed 
and a framework proposed to review this issue in the context of anti-competitive 
disputes in commercial shipbuilding.  For example, it is demonstrated how a VLCC 
tanker and a capesize dry bulk can be argued to be substitutable in the shipbuilding 
market, even though the two products are clearly not substitutable for the shipping 
sector.  The tanker cannot carry coal and the bulk carrier cannot carry crude oil, but 
this is of no relevance to the shipbuilder, providing that the two product types are 
compatible with the shipyard’s factors of competitiveness. 
2.10 Specific issues relating to ‘likeness’ are identified as relevant to the industry in 
Japan, relating to the relationship between Japanese shipowners and Japanese 
shipyards.  Under the concept of ‘customers tastes and habits’ , referring to case law 
in WTO dispute resolution processes for ‘subsidy and countervailing measures’, this 
relationship is relevant and should be defended. 
2.10 The research has provided clarification of issues that were faced in a ‘subsidy 
and countervailing measures’ dispute prosecuted by the EU in 2003 for alleged anti-
competitive practises in South Korean shipbuilding.  There remain issues in relation 
to the WTO process for dispute resolution for shipbuilding, however, that may need 
to be addressed if WTO is to be an effective mechanism for the resolution of subsidy 
disputes in commercial shipbuilding in future.  
3. Long term development of demand and cycles 
3.1. Long term analysis of output of commercial ships shows that cyclical peaks 
have recurred about every thirty years for the past 125 years.  This pattern can be 
seen clearly in the time series presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 – Global commercial shipbuilding output, 1892 to 20144 
3.2. Each successive peak has been exponentially larger than the previous peak, 
but the most recent two cycles (with peaks in 1975 and 2011) have been relatively 
similar in magnitude when compared to the size of the fleet at the time of the peak, 
with output equivalent to about 11% of the total gross tonnage of the fleet in each 
year5.  This cyclical pattern has led to difficulties in commercial shipbuilding.  In the 
period following WWII, two strong growth phases have led to investment in capacity 
that subsequently becomes redundant in the decline and trough phases.  This has 
led to periodic economic difficulties, through the effects of overcapacity on price and 
from under-utilisation of investment and assets.   These difficulties are felt not only in 
the shipyards but also in the supply chain. 
3.3. No attempt has been made to forecast the future of demand and the 
propagation of this cycle.  It is possible to say, however, that the underlying causes 
of the cycle have not changed and there is no reason currently to assume that this 
cyclical behaviour will not propagate in future.   
4. Market leaders and Japan’s place in global shipbuilding  
4.1. There has been a succession of dominating shipbuilding nations over the 
period examined and this has led some economists to postulate the existence of a 
‘hegemony’6 in the international commercial shipbuilding market, that is to say a 
market that is dominated at any time by a single nationality of supplier, the nationality 
shifting between countries over time.  The market lead moved from the UK to Japan 
following WWII, then to South Korea in the 1990s, and then to China in the 2000s.  
                                            
4 Source: P W Stott, using information from Lloyd’s Register returns and data available from 
Newcastle University’s Shipbuilding Special Collection.  Accurate data for the peak of output in the 
Second World War (WWII) period is not available.   
5 Tentative estimates for the peaks in 1919 and 1944 suggest that output was equivalent to 14% and 
19% of fleet size in each year respectively.  It is postulated that these higher percentages include an 
uplift to replace war losses, but that an underlying general cycle, as has persisted in the post-war 
period, also appears to have been present in the market at the earlier time. 
6 See, for example, Bruno, L. and Tenold, S. (2011) 'The basis for South Korea's ascent in the 
shipbuilding industry, 1970-1990', Mariners Mirror, 97(3), pp. 201-217. 
 -
 20,000
 40,000
 60,000
 80,000
 100,000
 120,000
18
92
18
99
19
06
19
1
3
19
20
19
27
19
34
19
41
19
48
19
55
19
6
2
19
69
19
76
19
83
19
90
19
97
20
04
20
11
Th
o
u
sa
n
d
 G
T
 6 
 
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. 
The postulated series of hegemonies can be seen in Figure 2, which tracks the 
market shares of the industry’s leading suppliers since 1892.   
 
Figure 2 – Share of the global commercial shipbuilding market held by the 
leading shipbuilding country, 1892 to 20147 
4.2. Figure 2 would support the assertion of shipbuilding being a successive 
hegemony but the true existence of a hegemony is questioned.  Acceptance of this 
supposed pattern without question presents the danger of a ‘self-fulfilling prophesy’, 
suggesting that the demise of the previous market leader is inevitable in the 
progression of the industry.  In the pattern as it currently presents itself this would 
suggest that Japan may follow the UK and see the demise of commercial 
shipbuilding, whilst South Korea will maintain a significant presence in the next 
cyclical upturn, during which China will take the lead.  The only evidence for this 
pattern, however, is the ‘circumstantial’ evidence shown in this diagram.  
4.3. It is true to say that the share of the UK shipbuilding industry has decreased 
virtually to zero, as output has in most of European shipbuilding (excluding the 
lucrative cruise sector).  The UK’s market dominance was based on two factors: 
technical leadership of the industry developed in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries coupled to a strong demand generated by a significant home market.  The 
UK lost the technological lead by the 1920s as other nations caught up and then 
overtook the British industry, and British investment and technology subsequently 
                                            
7 Source: P W Stott, using information from Lloyd’s Register returns and data available from 
Newcastle University’s Shipbuilding Special Collection. 
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became obsolete in the post-WWII era.  The UK’s home market also subsequently 
disappeared in the shift from Empire to globalisation following WWII. 
4.4. Japan’s industry developed as part of the country’s  ‘economic miracle’ that 
followed WWII and the market leadership was essentially based on the same 
underlying factors that led to the previous UK market dominance: technological 
leadership in the radically new shipbuilding strategies developed post-WWII, coupled 
to a strong home market8.  Japan has lost neither of these factors as the UK had 
done previously, and the loss of leadership in Japanese shipbuilding does not have 
similar characteristics to the loss of leadership in the UK.  Japanese shipping 
companies remain important buyers of new ships and there remains an element of 
preference to build these wherever possible in Japanese shipyards.  The underlying 
causes of demise of the UK industry are therefore not present in the Japanese case 
and there is no reason to suppose that the industry in Japan will inevitably follow the 
UK in decline. 
4.5. Japan’s ascendancy was aided by a significant increase in commercial 
shipbuilding volume that accompanied the development of globalisation following 
WWII and the industry developed on a scale far greater than anything that had 
preceded it.  This is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows output from the market 
leading nationalities, rather than the share shown in Figure 2.  Peak output has 
increased with each successive leader, and it is clear that Japanese shipbuilding has 
not declined in the way that the British industry did before it. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Commercial Shipbuilding’s Shifting Hegemony – output from 
dominating suppliers9 
                                            
8 Stott, P.W. (2017) 'Shipbuilding innovation: enabling technologies and economic imperatives', 
Journal of ship design and production, 33(3), pp. 1-11. 
9 Source: P W Stott, using information from Lloyd’s Register returns and data available from 
Newcastle University’s Shipbuilding Special Collection. 
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4.6. South Korea’s ascendancy to the market lead was based on a different set of 
factors to the preceding market leaders.  South Korea has never had a strong 
domestic market to provide a baseload of work for the shipyards and, unlike the 
previous two market leaders, has been dependant predominantly on exports.  Only 
6% of CGT10 produced by South Korean shipyards at the peak of output in 2011 was 
for domestic buyers, compared to 66% for Japanese output in the same year.  South 
Korea also never developed a technological lead, as both the UK and Japan had 
done previously, but concentrated on the pursuit of competiveness through 
investment in volume and economies of scale, both in the shipyards and in the 
domestic supply chain.  Elements of competitiveness include a strong local supply 
chain for steel and marine equipment coupled to contracts that control the makers 
list, directing work to that supply chain.   
4.7. Figure 4 presents an illustration of the development of volume and economy 
of scale in market leaders since 1960, showing the output from the market leading 
shipyard at the start of each decade.  South Korean market leader DSME in 2010 
produced eight times the tonnage and nine times as many ships compared to 
Japanese market leader, Mitsubishi Nagasaki, in 1970.  Comparing the peak years 
1975 and 2010, the market leader HHI Ulsan at the recent peak produced four times 
the tonnage and six times the number of vessels, compared to Mitsubishi Nagasaki 
at the previous peak.  The largest Korean yards are estimated to have been 
processing over 3 million tonnes of steel per annum each at the recent market peak. 
 
 
                                            
10 Compensated Gross Tonnage – a non-dimensional measure of shipbuilding work content. 
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Figure 4 - Largest commercial shipbuilders by decade (output in the year 
indicated – data sourced from Sea-Web) 
4.8. The relative strengths of the domestic supply chains is illustrated by 
comparing the proportion of domestic purchases of main engines in 2010.  In that 
year 92% of main engines were domestically sourced by South Korean shipbuilders, 
compared to 99% by Japanese builders but only 41% by Chinese builders, where 
the marine equipment supply chain is, so far, less well developed.   
4.9. The pursuit of competitiveness through volume and control of the supply chain 
has been facilitated by the increasing volume of demand that can be seen in Figures 
1 and 3 and by the standardisation11 of the main products by suppliers.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 5 that shows the reduction in product variety and increase in 
product volumes by reviewing the product mixes of the market leaders in 1960 and 
around the two subsequent market peaks in 1975 and 2010.  The form of this 
diagram follows that developed for analysis of output in the automotive sector and 
demonstrates that shipbuilding has broadly followed the same development track in 
terms of volume and standardisation as found in that sector12. 
                                            
11 Quasi-standardisation is probably a better term.  Products in the modern era are not identical as the 
Liberty Ships were in WWII, but are very similar between contracts.  VLCCs, for example, vary little 
between ships from the same suppliers or even between suppliers and long runs of very similar ship 
types are now the norm in most of commercial shipbuilding. 
12 Analysis by P W Stott, based on the methodology presented in: Womack, J.P., Jones, D.T., Roos, 
D. and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (1990) ‘The machine that changed the world’. New 
York: Rawson Associates. 
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Figure 5 - Progression of product variety and production volume in 
shipbuilding industry market leaders13 
4.10 The horizontal axis shows number of different products built over the year (for 
example, VLCC, Suezmax, LNG, etc.) and the vertical axis the average number of 
each product delivered in the year.  The combination of the two values (number of 
products x volume per product) equals total number of ships delivered in the year 
shown.  The chart shows that in 1960 each product from the market leading German 
shipbuilder was more or less14 unique (with a value of 1 on the vertical axis), with 
little or no standardisation.  By 1975 the market leading ‘tanker factory’ in Japan was 
series-building a single product type – VLCCs (with a value of 1 on the horizontal 
axis).  Concentration on a single product was found to be unsustainable, however, 
and in 2010 the market leader was offering a product mix of 9 different ship types 
over the year, with an average output of 7 of each. 
4.11 South Korea’s strategy has led to the development of a highly concentrated 
industry dominated by a small number of ultra-large shipyards.  7 major shipyards at 
the peak of output in 2011 accounted for 83% of CGT produced in South Korea in 
that year, each yard producing over 1 million CGT per annum.  As the market has 
declined the proportion of total South Korean output produced by these 7 largest 
yards has increased to 88% in 2017.  Figure 6 presents a comparison of the level of 
concentration of suppliers in Japan and South Korea in 2011. 
                                            
13 For development of this diagram, see: Stott, P.W. (2017) ‘Competition and Subsidy in Commercial 
Shipbuilding’. PhD thesis. Newcastle University. 
14 The analysis looked at 1 year’s output only, not taking into account potential sister ships in other 
years. 
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Figure 6 – Comparison of concentration of capacity in the shipbuilding 
industries of Japan and South Korea in 2017  
4.12. The difference in concentration of capacity represents an important difference 
between the industries of South Korea and Japan.  The number of shipyards 
delivering vessels over 5,000 GT has reduced from 24 in South Korea in 2011 to 13 
in 2017, compared to a reduction from 53 shipyards to 51 in Japan.  It is postulated 
that the greater concentration of capacity in South Korea has led to vulnerability in 
the face of the inevitable cyclical downturn.  The ultra-large shipyards of South Korea 
were undoubtedly highly efficient at the peak of the market in 2011, but significant 
under-utilisation of the investment in the falling market raises a question relating to 
the viability of this strategy in the face of a market that is so strongly cyclical.  
Without access to the volume needed for efficiency, the economic viability of strategy 
that pursues competitiveness primarily through scale is open to question.   
4.13. The current state of the market certainly supports a contention that the 
industry in South Korea may be more vulnerable than that in Japan, where technical 
lead and the domestic market continue to contribute to competitiveness.  For South 
Korea, on the other hand, the level of competitive advantage derived from high 
volume production has declined since the peak.  South Korea’s orderbook continues 
to decline and output and capacity utilisation in the 7 major builders is therefore 
inevitably likely to decline further.  Japan’s orderbook and deliveries have declined 
significantly since the peak of 2011 but remain relatively stronger than Korea.  
Output from South Korea in 2017 was only 56% of that achieved at the peak, 
compared to 68% in Japan.   
4.14. Vulnerability of shipbuilders is reflected in backlog, being the quantity of work 
contained in the committed orderbook, measured in years, taking into account active 
capacity.  The development of the backlog over time in the commercial shipbuilding 
industry as a whole is presented in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 – Estimated backlog of work in international commercial shipbuilding 
measured in years15 
4.15. It can be seen that backlog has remained above two years at all points in the 
past twenty years, and rose to over 5 years at the market peak.  Backlog is 
maintained through the balance of orders with capacity and active capacity has 
reduced as demand has fallen in recent years, through redundancy of workers and 
subcontractors in particular.  Physical capacity per se is difficult to reduce 
temporarily and tends to persist.  Backlog is psychologically significant for 
shipbuilders.  For example, for a shipyard that typically takes 9 months to build a 
ship, if the backlog were to fall below 9 months the yard would be working on its last 
orders and rapidly running out of work and the need for new contracts will be 
desperate.  A backlog below 18 months means that the shipyard would be working 
towards the last order situation and the need for new contracts will become pressing.   
4.16. The relative vulnerability of the industries in Japan and South Korea can be 
seen in the relative development of backlog, presented in Figure 8.  South Korea’s 
estimated backlog has fallen to about 18 months and is continuing to fall as the 
orderbook declines.  Japanese shipbuilding, on the other hand, has so far managed 
to maintain the estimated backlog above two years.  It is concluded from this that the 
industry in South Korea may be struggling to a greater extent to maintain the level of 
order intake needed to adequately utilise the seven ultra-large shipyards.   
 
                                            
15   For development of this and other backlog charts, see: Stott, P.W. (2017) ‘Competition and 
Subsidy in Commercial Shipbuilding’. PhD thesis. Newcastle University.   
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Figure 8 – Estimated backlog of work in commercial shipyards in Japan and 
South Korea measured in years 
4.17. Japan’s shipbuilding industry may find that having once been the industry’s 
dominating leader but having lost that lead, with the political, social and economic 
difficulties associated with the decline, could easily lead to an un-justified negative 
political view of the industry, as has happened in the UK.  In the prevailing poor 
market it is important that Japan rationally evaluates the value of the commercial 
shipbuilding industry to the country, and that this evaluation is not clouded by an 
assumption of the inevitably of decline as the market lead shifts to other countries.     
4.18 More research is needed to better understand the shipbuilding cycle and its 
causes.  The cycle is exaggerated at the peaks by over-ordering, which essentially 
results from the nature of backlog in shipbuilding: the delivery of new orders persists 
for years (up to 5 years at the 2011 peak) following the realisation that fleet capacity 
is growing too rapidly to be absorbed by growth in seaborne trade.  Put another way, 
there are no brakes on the system and over-ordering leads to overcapacity in the 
fleet, which in turn leads to low freight rates that reduce ordering of new tonnage for 
extended periods, leading to the decline and trough phases of the shipbuilding cycle.  
The exaggeration of the cycle suggests that the trough phases are longer than they 
could be and that capacity utilisation is lower than it needs to be, due to the 
development of excess capacity to produce the exaggerated peak.    
4.19. Whilst it is not suggested that anything could be done to alter the cycle per se, 
it may be possible to develop methodologies that would reduce the level of 
exaggeration of the cycle and the amount of over-ordering.  One such methodology 
would be the development of a leading indicator that warns when the market has 
become over-heated.  Reduction of the exaggeration of the cycle may be beneficial 
to both the shipbuilding and the shipping industries over the long term, and this is 
recommended for further study. 
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5. The nature of the commercial shipbuilding market and 
competitiveness 
5.1. Research at Newcastle University concluded that the commercial shipbuilding 
market was found to exist as an economic entity but it is not a single market16.  
Three sectors are proposed, demarcated by size:  
 the Workboat Market, below 500 GT;  
 the Small Ship Market, between 500 and 5,000 GT and; 
 the International Commercial Shipbuilding Market above 5,000 GT.   
5.2. The three sectors are differentiated by: 
 market volume, which reduces exponentially with ship size;  
 difference in products, an OSV, for example, belonging in a different market 
sector to large container ships;  
 the extent of domestic ordering preference, which increases as ship size 
reduces and;  
 the nature of volatility.  Volatility exists in the smaller sectors but only the 
large sector experiences the extreme cyclical behaviour described in the 
previous sections of this report.   
5.3. The research at Newcastle University concentrated on the international 
commercial shipbuilding sector.  The two smaller sectors (workboat and small ship) 
and price links between the three sectors, investigating, for example, whether the 
price for an OSV is influenced by price movements in the market for large ship 
types, has not been undertaken. 
5.4. There are two key principles that must be clearly understood to correctly 
analyse the commercial shipbuilding market: 
a) the market is constituted by the sale of shipyard capacity, not the sale of 
products and ship prices fluctuate in response to changes in the value of that 
capacity: 
b) shipyard capacity in the modern industry has to be flexible between different 
products that are technically compatible with that capacity. 
5.5. At the point at which a shipbuilding contract is concluded, the buyer does not 
(except in rare circumstances) purchase a ship.  The contract is a promise to provide 
capacity at some future time (commonly referred to as a ‘slot’ in a yard’s build 
programme) to build that ship.  If the contract were to be cancelled prior to the 
commencement of production of the ship, the shipyard would endeavour to re-sell 
that slot but this would not necessarily involve replacing the order with the same 
originally contracted ship type.  The re-sale would be to whichever product 
                                            
16 For details on this work se: Stott, P.W. (2017) ‘Competition and Subsidy in Commercial 
Shipbuilding’. PhD thesis. Newcastle University. 
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represents the best value at the time of the re-sale and which is compatible with the 
shipyard’s product mix.   
5.6. Virtually all modern shipbuilders offer a range of ship types that are technically 
compatible with the yard’s investment, normally referred to as the ‘product mix’.  
Examples of single product yards have existed, including currently the leading cruise 
ship builders in Europe, but such specialisations have tended to be temporary, 
supported by transient market conditions.  Other examples include the liberty ship 
emergency shipyards in the United States in WWII and ‘tanker factories’ developed 
in Japan in the 1960s.  The leading such factory was Mitsubishi Nagasaki, which 
series-built VLCCs up to the 1975 market peak and was the global shipbuilding 
market leader at the time of that peak.  Shifts in the market, however, meant that the 
focus only on large tankers was found to be unsustainable.  An initial large volume of 
orders established the VLCC as a ship type in the ten years between 1968 and 
1978, leading to the conditions that supported series building of that ship type as a 
single product.  After that time the demand for VLCCs crashed, not recovering 
substantially until the 1990s.  The Mitsubishi ‘tanker factory’ therefore had to look for 
work in other sectors to utilise capacity.    
5.7. To survive, therefore, shipbuilders have to offer a product mix to utilise 
capacity, to respond to demand shifts in the market between product types.  It 
follows that the units of capacity offered to the market, and on which value in 
shipbuilding is based, have to be flexible between different products.  This provides 
the basis on which prices between different products are linked and explains how 
pricing behaviour in one ship type can influence the price of a different ship type. 
5.8. The products that make up a shipyard’s product mix have to be physically 
compatible with the capacity being sold and have to key into the factors of  
competitiveness that determine how that capacity successfully wins contracts.  The 
factors that determine compatibility are: 
a) compatibility with the fixed capital investment in the shipyard.  This is in two 
parts.  Firstly the product must be compatible with the investment in the 
launching and workshop facilities in terms of its size.  Secondly, the balance 
of work content inherent in the product, in particular in terms of steelwork and 
outfit work, should be compatible with the investment in workshops and the 
skills balance of the workforce. 
b) The volume of orders available should be sufficient to gain capacity utilisation 
at an achievable level of market share. 
c) The extent to which the product offers the potential for development of 
standard ships, which offer volume and can be tied in to the supply chain. 
d) The effects of barriers to entry, as exist, for example, in the construction of 
cruise ships or LNG tankers. 
5.9. A framework has been developed to enable these factors to be reviewed 
together to analyse technical compatibility between the main commercial 
shipbuilding products.  An example for large (post-panamax) products is presented 
in Figure 9.  The features of this diagram are: 
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1. the diameter of the circles represents demand volume;  
2. patterned shading of the circles indicates barriers to entry (for LNG and 
cruise);   
3. positioning on the horizontal axis (net tonnes of steel per CGT) provides a 
proxy for compatibility with a shipyard’s workshops and skills balance;  
4. positioning on the vertical axis (ship size represented by GT) provides a proxy 
for compatibility of ship size with the investment in workshops and launching 
facilities;   
5. the dark shaded circles represent products for which series of quasi-standard 
designs can be offered whilst the white circle represents a niche product, 
where short series or unique designs remain the norm. 
 
Figure 9 – Framework for identification of technical substitutability of products 
in the large (post-panamax) ship sector17 
5.10 The closer two products appear in this framework the greater the compatibility 
and this diagram illustrates why, for example, from the point of view of a shipbuilder 
a post-panamax container ship and a suezmax tanker are very similar, despite being 
very different products from the point of view of the buyer.  The diagram also 
explains why cruise shipbuilding is not like any other sector and would require 
diversification of investment and skills to successfully gain access on a competitive 
basis. 
5.11 The results suggest that the flexibility of a unit of capacity is wide, with 
shipbuilders able to technically address most market sectors that are suitably sized 
for the facilities.  The main exceptions are: LNG, for which barriers to entry exist and 
                                            
17 For development of this diagram, see: Stott, P.W. (2017) ‘Competition and Subsidy in Commercial 
Shipbuilding’. PhD thesis. Newcastle University. 
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for which specific investments and skills are required, and Cruise and Ferry, for 
which barriers to entry exist and for which the characteristics of investment in both 
physical and human capital and the supply chain are different to mainstream 
shipbuilding. 
5.12 Consideration of the matching of products with the characteristics of the 
shipyard, and in particular consideration of the way that the builder pursues 
competitiveness, can explain why shipyards may or may not be successful in trying 
to diversify to survive.  For example, a shipyard that gains its competitiveness 
through volume construction of standard products that key into the domestic supply 
chain of steel and equipment suppliers, is likely to be less competitive in trying to 
move into offshore fabrication.  Offshore products may be large but steelwork is 
relatively of lower importance when compared to commercial ships, the commercial 
ship supply chain is of limited relevance (decisions on makers list may not be under 
the control of the builder and key equipment, such as a main engine, may not be 
required at all), where contract and project management structures may be different 
(for example, reflected in the relatively increased importance of outfit and 
commissioning for offshore products) and where each product in the offshore sector 
may be more or less unique.  Such a shift would key into none of the factors of 
competitiveness that gave the shipyard an advantage in commercial shipbuilding 
through volume ship production.   Offshore work would not key into the advantages 
of the established fixed and human capital investments and this shift would therefore 
represent a major diversification requiring the development of a new set of factors of 
competitiveness for successful operation. 
6. Newbuild prices 
6.1. For a market to exist in economic terms, prices of the products in the market 
should respond collectively to market conditions.  The WTO panel in 2003 concluded 
that insufficient evidence had been presented in these terms to demonstrate that 
different products in commercial shipbuilding were part of the same market.  It is not 
sufficient that the products are technically compatible as discussed in the previous 
section, but it must also be established that prices for the different products respond 
to the same market forces. 
6.2. Analysts have long noted that prices for different ship types move up and 
down in parallel and this has been taken as sufficient by some researchers to 
conclude that commercial shipbuilding exists in a single market18.   Whilst this 
coincidence of price movements is compelling, it is not sufficient from a rigorously 
analytical point of view to confirm statistically that a single market exists. 
6.3. Two methodologies were utilised to examine price behaviour in commercial 
shipbuilding: correlation between prices for different products and linear regression 
models for evaluation of price influences19.  The results were only partially successful 
                                            
18 See for example: Wijnolst, N. and Wergeland, T. (1996) ‘Shipping’. Delft: Delft University, p. 184. 
19 For details of the statistical analysis see: Stott, P.W. (2017) ‘Competition and Subsidy in 
Commercial Shipbuilding’. PhD thesis. Newcastle University. 
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due to complexities in the modelling but the results did show that demand for certain 
ship types were influential in price determination for other different ship types and 
confirmed that cross-price elasticity exists between different products in commercial 
shipbuilding.  Demand for container ships and LNG tankers were found to have had 
the strongest influence on prices over the period examined (2003 to 2015).  Having 
said this, the complexities in the cost modelling mean that it has not been possible to 
generalise results outside that time period and work is ongoing to examine this 
question further. 
6.4. The cost modelling largely concurred with previous conclusions of academic 
studies of price determination in the commercial shipbuilding sector, in that price was 
found to be determined by a combination of factors, including:  
a) the rational value of the purchase to the buyer, determined by the ship 
owner’s earnings: in other words, reflecting how much the customer is willing 
to pay; 
b) newbuilding costs; 
c) demand. 
6.5. The modelling found additionally: 
a) demand for alternative (substitutable) products may be more influential on 
price than the demand for the product itself; 
b) backlog was found to be a strong determinant of price; 
c) the level of significance of different determinants changed depending on the 
stage of the demand cycle. 
6.6. Backlog is an important parameter for both the buyer of new ships and for the 
shipyard.  For the buyer it represents scarcity of capacity and reflects the business 
risk faced due to the lag between placing an order and receiving the ship.  For a 
shipbuilder it represents scarcity of work and reflects vulnerability of the business.   
6.7. These findings are consistent with and support the theory developed that ship 
price is derived from the underlying value of capacity, as well as from tangible 
elements such as build cost.  The variation in significance of influencing factors over 
time is summarised as follows: 
a) In a rising market the influence of the rational value of the purchase to the 
buyer becomes more significant, with shipbuilders raising prices as fast as 
possible. 
b) In a falling market shipbuilding costs become of greater significance but the 
shipbuilder will initially be reluctant to reduce prices, with a buffer workload 
being provided by a strong backlog.  As backlog is eroded the shipbuilder will 
become more motivated to reduce prices.  This tendency in a falling market 
may therefore explain what some researchers20 have referred to as 
‘stickiness’ in the movement of newbuilding prices, which may not move as 
might be expected based on the buyers’ rational valuation. 
                                            
20 See for example: Beenstock, M. (1985) 'A theory of ship prices', Maritime Policy & Management, 
12(3), pp. 215-225. 
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c) In a trough market shipbuilding costs, modified by government intervention, 
will present a strong influence. 
7. Like products and WTO 
7.1. The concept of ‘like products’ or ‘substitutable products’ is at the core of 
understanding the competition between different products that exist in the same 
market and correct understanding of this concept is central to the successful 
prosecution of action for anti-competitive practices.  Like or ‘substitutable’ products 
would show similar responses in terms of price, based on market conditions. 
7.2. The concept of like product as it applies to commercial shipbuilding was not 
successfully established in the ruling of the WTO panel in 2003 and understanding 
this situation has been a central part of the research undertaken at Newcastle 
University. 
7.3. The confusion of the WTO panel is understandable given the differing nature 
of the products offered.  A container ship, for example, can self-evidently not carry 
LNG and vice versa – how can it be argued that the two very different ship types are 
‘like’ or ‘substitutable’ in the context of the market?  The answer to this question has 
been found in the analysis of value and flexibility of capacity and by studying the 
case law that defines the concept in WTO. 
7.4. It has to be established from whose point of view ‘likeness’ has to be judged.  
From the point of view of the buyer, the two ship types quoted above are certainly 
not ‘substitutable’ and are not like products – they functionally do very different 
things.  From the point of view of the shipbuilder, however, they may be substitutable 
if they key into the shipyard’s factors of competitiveness and are both compatible 
with the shipyard’s units of capacity, or in other words that they are part of the 
shipyard’s product mix.  It has been established that the market is constituted by the 
forward sale of capacity and not specifically by products, and that capacity for a 
modern shipbuilder has to be flexible between products.  It is the limits of this 
flexibility that provide the definition of like product in commercial shipbuilding.  Ships 
that can be competed for by a unit of capacity are those that are ‘like’ for a shipyard.  
The functional view of the products from the buyer’s perspective is of no relevance. 
7.5. Additionally, there is a specific aspect of the concept of ‘likeness’ in WTO that 
may be of significance in certain circumstances, for example in the cruise market or 
relating in general to shipbuilding market behaviour in Japan.  This relates to a 
concept in WTO case law normally referred to as ‘customer’s tastes and habits’.  
This concept seeks to take into account established customer behaviour and its 
influence on suppliers to a market, including established relationships between 
customers and suppliers.  Such relationships are relevant to the consideration of ‘like 
product’.  An example would be long established relationships between specific 
customers and specific shipyards, as is found in the cruise sector.  Such a 
relationship could be regarded as significant in the prosecution of an action where a 
customer has been lured away from the established supplier with the aid of subsidy 
provided to a competitor. 
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7.6. In the case of Japanese commercial shipbuilding, there is a strong 
coincidence between the products offered by Japanese shipbuilders and the 
products purchased by Japanese ship owners, and there is a strongly established 
tendency to purchase at home shipyards.  This relationship would be significant in 
the context of action in WTO where established customers had been persuaded to 
purchase at other shipyards and where this was the result of anti-competitive 
behaviour.  No such coincidence of products between buyer and seller has been 
identified in other shipbuilding nations, and this is therefore identified as a specific 
contributor to competitiveness in Japanese shipbuilding that may be defended. 
8. Limitations of WTO in the regulation of competition in 
shipbuilding. 
8.1. Research at Newcastle University has provided a revised perspective that 
could assist in the prosecution of action for anti-competitive behaviour under the 
WTOs ‘Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, should the need for 
such action arise in the future, and which addresses problems faced by such a 
prosecution in 2003. 
8.2. Having said that there remain other barriers to prosecution in WTO, in 
particular the requirement to demonstrate ‘specificity’, which states that in principle 
subsidies can only be actionable when they are specific to a particular contract, and 
that money must specifically change hands in relation to that contract at the time the 
contract is progressed.  Having to prove such specificity in commercial shipbuilding 
may be practically impossible, particularly given the forward nature of contracts.  For 
this reason it is concluded that shipbuilding possibly needs to be considered as a 
special case in WTO regulations, as for example is found in agriculture.  Political will 
would be needed to make this change but without this, commercial shipbuilding may 
remain outside the ability of WTO to regulate competition and potential harm caused 
to the industry of one country by government intervention in the industry of another 
country. 
